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Privacy-preserving COVID-19 Contact Tracing
using Blockchain
Shahzaib Tahir, Hasan Tahir, Ali Sajjad, Muttukrishnan Rajarajan, and Fawad Khan
Abstract—The outbreak of the COVID-19 virus has caused
widespread panic and global initiatives are geared towards treat-
ment and limiting its spread. With technological advancements,
several mechanisms and mobile applications have been developed
that attempt to trace the physical contact made by a person
with someone who has been tested COVID-19 positive. While
designing these apps, user’s privacy has been an afterthought
and has resulted in mass violations of privacy of the public and
the patients. A total of 32 countries have designed apps and
rely on them as a strategy to flatten the pandemic curve. Along
with lack of privacy, these methodologies are centralized, where
they are fully controlled by the government and the healthcare
providers. Owing to these and many other concerns, people
are hesitant in the adoption of these technologies. This paper
presents a detailed analysis of user tracking apps belonging
to 32 countries, thus demonstrating that they collect personal
data and are a gross violation of user privacy. This paper
presents a novel architecture for the efficient, effective and
privacy-preserving contact tracing of COVID-19 patients using
blockchain. The proposed architecture preserves the privacy of
individuals and their contact history by encrypting all the data
specific to an individual using a privacy-preserving Homomorphic
encryption scheme and storing it on a permissioned blockchain
network. The contacts made with a COVID-19 positive patient
are identified by performing search queries directly over the
Homomorphic encrypted data stored in the blocks. Therefore,
only those contacts that are suspected to be COVID-19 positive
may be decrypted by the healthcare professional or government
for further contact tracing/ diagnosis and COVID-19 testing;
thereby leading to enhanced privacy.
Index Terms—Coronavirus, Hyperledger Fabric, pandemic,
searchable encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
ONE of the biggest challenge being faced by the worldin the 21st century is dealing with the COVID-19
pandemic [1]. The virus originated on the 20th Oct, 2020,
it has spread across every country, claimed more than 4.2
million lives and more than 200 Million positive cases have
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been reported worldwide [2]. The pandemic has widely ef-
fected all and its impact has been seen in both emerging
and developed economies as industrial production and trade
is adversely effected, leaving millions jobless resulting in
global poverty. These unprecedented times have also put the
healthcare systems of the world leading countries under stress.
All countries have their own national healthcare systems which
are considered mature enough to deal with any epidemic,
pandemic or emergent situations. To name a few systems,
the UK relies on the national health service (NHS), US has
health and human services (HHS) while the Italian public
health service is known as servizio asnitario nazionale (SSN).
However, these system have struggled to cope with the pan-
demic and failed to offer healthcare services to the influx of
patients suffering with COVID-19. The world leading hospitals
grossly failed to provide the essential patient care materials
and equipments including ventilators and intravenous pumps.
Therefore, a mechanism was required to systematically control
the community transmission of the virus in an attempt to
reduce the number of patients seeking medical help.
The primary reason behind the spread of the Coronavirus
is when an individual comes in contact with someone who is
infected (COVID-19 positive). The world health organization
(WHO) defines a contact as [3]:
• Being within 1 metre of a COVID-19 positive for more
than 15 minutes;
• Coming in direct/physical contact with a COVID-19
positive case;
• Someone or a healthcare professional providing direct
care for COVID-19 positive patients without following
the defined SOPs and without using personal protective
equipment (PPE).
According to the WHO, this virus can be contained by wearing
PPE, maintaining social distance, self-isolating, and by con-
centrating on personal hygiene [4]. While all these methods
have proven to be effective in prevention; the dominant method
adopted internationally has been the enforcement of lock-down
protocols through social distancing and self isolation. This
gave rise to the dire need of having a mechanism to trace the
community contacts made by a COVID-19 positive to contain
the spread of the virus. In regard to this, many countries have
been working on developing their own contact tracing apps,
for example, UK has developed an NHS coronavirus app, US
is planning to use the Exposure Notification API developed by
Apple and Google, and Italy has already launched its version
of contact tracing app called “Immuni”.
The existing healthcare systems were governed by strict
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rules and regulations such as the latest EU general data protec-
tion regulation (GDPR) [5], [6], applicable to all EU member
states, and the health insurance portability accountability act
(HIPAA) [7] enacted by the United States congress, lead to a
compelling case to demonstrate accountability and compliance
to these regulations. These regulations increased the patient’s
trust in the system that resulted in the patient willingly
providing access to critical health data to enhance the quality,
safety, and outcome of care. Thus, it was important to ensure
that healthcare systems and devices process user data while
maintaining privacy, security, and scalability. However, to deal
with the pandemic and to perform effective contact tracing,
many EU member states have flexed the existing regulations.
For example, the Article 9(1) of the GDPR states [5]:
“Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade
union membership, and the processing of genetic data,
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a
natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a
natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be
prohibited.”
The above mentioned clause has now been suspended in the
face of civil crisis and is supported by the following clause
already part of the GDPR, Article 9(2-i) [5]:
“Processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the
area of public health, such as protecting against serious
cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of
quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products
or medical devices, on the basis of Union or Member State
law which provides for suitable and specific measures to
safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in
particular professional secrecy;”
Similarly, Italian civil protection department during the
early stage of the COVID-19 outbreak on February 3, 2020
adopted civil protection ordinance No.630 [8]. This ordinance
allows the civil protection personnel to analyze the sensitive
data restricted access to in the GDPR Article 9(1). HIPAA
has been widely adopted by the US. The HIPAA regulation
has not been suspended, rather the fines as a result of the
violations have been removed for the time being to facilitate
and encourage data analytics by the civil protection personnel
in these unprecedented times and mainly for contact tracing.
Similarly, France and Germany have also issued advisory notes
that relax the existing regulations to facilitate contact tracing.
Having said this, it would not be wrong to say that in the
challenging times, in regards to contact tracing, security and
privacy is being treated as an after thought. While the intention
behind contact tracing was commendable and justified; its
outcomes and implications were perhaps not given enough
thought. Reliance on a policy does not give ground to a
purpose that is questionable and does not make it justified. Due
to the reduced regulatory influence on the contact tracing app,
people often link this tracing capability as “lack of freedom”
and hence it is being politicized. In [9] authors study public
attitudes towards contact tracing apps within the UK. The
main concerns highlighted by the people included; a) lack of
privacy, b) social stigma, and c) lack of uptake.
Since the existing contact tracing services have suffered
from weaknesses such as lack of privacy in sharing sensitive
data with the third parties [10], [11]. As a result, the entire data
can be disclosed to the third parties involved during the tracing
process. Third parties such as healthcare providers, insurance
companies, pharmacies, researchers, etc., should have different
access privileges/views of the patient data so that security
and privacy related issues can be addressed efficiently and
effectively. Therefore, this leads to the requirement of an
architecture that solves the following inherent problems related
to contact tracing:
• Security and privacy
• Authentication and access control
• Flexibility and scalability
• Interoperability and efficiency
This paper explores a novel privacy preserving COVID-
19 contact tracing (PPCCT) architecture that enables contact
tracing, thereby addressing the problems enlisted above and
refers to them as the design principles further discussed in
the Section III. The PPCCT architecture primarily focuses
on securely handling contact data including; the patient data
held by the hospital to uniquely identify an individual found
COVID-19 positive. The proposed architecture also takes care
of the sensitive data related to other individuals with whom
contact was made by a COVID-19 positive. PPCCT enables
efficient contact management and tracing over a permissioned
blockchain infrastructure. This enables the possibility of main-
taining/inferring immutable contact records related to the
users/ entities involved in the application. PPCCT architecture
ensures a higher level of security and privacy preservation as it
is based on privacy-preserving homomorphic-based searchable
encryption (HSE) and the concept of permissioned Blockchain.
These technologies jointly enhance the usability, security,
efficiency, scalability, and immutability in a privacy-preserving
manner.
A. Contributions
This research makes the following contributions to the field
of healthcare:
• This paper analyzes the different COVID-19 tracing ap-
plications used worldwide by 32 countries and highlights
their shortcomings in terms of security and privacy.
• The paper proposes a novel privacy-preserving COVID-
19 contact tracing (CCT) architecture based on permis-
sioned blockchain. The permissioned blockchain in effect
helps to achieve immutability, provenance, traceability,
transparency, enhanced security, and restricted access.
The architecture is based on the use of state-of-the-
art homomorphic-based privacy-preserving searchable en-
cryption scheme.
• We design and develop a COVID-19 contact tracing
solution to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed
PPCCT architecture. The developed solution highlights
the functionality of the PPCCT architecture and the
advantages it has to offer.
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B. Organization
Section II discusses the existing contact tracing apps that
are being used by 32 countries across the globe. Section III
presents the proposed privacy preserving COVID-19 Contact
Tracing architecture by highlighting the design principles.
Section IV presents a discussion on the proposed architecture
against the design principles presented in the Section III.
Section V presents the COVID-19 contact tracing solution in
the form of a proof of concept prototype after implementing
the PPCCT architecture. The conclusions are drawn towards
the end of the paper in Section VI.
II. PREVIOUS WORK
Countries around the globe are developing COVID-19
smartphone apps to help their respective health services with
contact tracing and instantaneous notification to their citizens
when and if their COVID-19 infection has been confirmed.
The hope is that the wide deployment of these apps will help
limit the spread of the coronavirus and enable the countries to
relax their lockdown restrictions more quickly. Most of these
apps are utilising Bluetooth LE [12] radio signals to check and
log the proximity of smartphone users to each other, and then
using either “centralised” or “decentralised” models to process
the data gathered in this process. Similarly, a technique [13]
has been proposed aiming to limit the outbreak of COVID-19
by determining a safe movement distance from a Bluetooth
PAN creator. The authors have created an effective method that
uses Bluetooth to measure distances with a high reliability.
In the centralised model, the data gathered from a user is
uploaded to a central server, often managed by a national
health service, where it is analysed with similar data gathered
from other users. The centralised model gives better data
analysis related insights to epidemiologists of the verified
health authority. Various protocols have been designed around
this model to facilitate logging of a user when in close
proximity of other users, uploading and processing these
contact logs on a centralized server and then individually
notifying users of potential contact with an infected user.
Pan-European privacy-preserving proximity tracing (PEPP-
PT/PEPP) [14] and BlueTrace [15] are examples of protocols
following the centralised model. These and similar protocols
have been implemented as smartphone apps by many countries
around the globe, e.g., the contact-tracing app deployed in
China [16] collects data on a user’s movements and uploads
it to a central database. An AI system analyses this database
and returns a colour code (green, amber or red), which is used
to enforce restrictions on the user’s movement. Similar apps
have been deployed by South Korea [17], Singapore [18], India
[19], Australia [20], etc. The main disadvantage of centralised
contact-tracing apps is potential of privacy invasion [21], as all
data shared by the users is fully visible to the central diagnostic
and analysis service by design. This design also introduces a
single point of data vulnerability and exposure in case of a
successful attack on the service.
On the other hand, in the decentralised model, the data
gathered from a user remains on his/her smartphone and not
shared with a central server. Different protocols have been
designed around this model to facilitate the tracking and
logging of a user when in close proximity of other users,
however all contact logs are not uploaded to a central server.
Only once a user tests positive for an infection, a report
containing their last 14 days’ proximity data is sent to a central
repository managed by a verified health authority. Other users
can download reports of last 14 days from the repository and
independently check them against their local contact logs for
possible recent contacts with any infected person. Examples
of protocols implementing this model are temporary contact
number (TCN) protocol [22], decentralized privacy-preserving
proximity tracing (DP3T) [23] and the Google/Apple exposure
notification framework for contact-tracing [24]. This model
has also been taken up and implemented by many countries
like Italy [25], Germany [26], Poland [27], Switzerland [28],
United Kingdom [29], etc. The decentralised model gives
better privacy guarantees than the centralised model, but only
with regard to location tracking of the users. A sophisticated
attacker can still gain information about at-risk individuals
and infected individuals by eavesdropping the Bluetooth sig-
nals and de-anonymising the contact logs of known reported
users [30]. False alert injection attack is also a possibility
where a malicious adversary can target a victim’s app to raise
false infection alerts. This model also requires more computing
power on the client side to process the infection reports,
which can be problematic on power-constrained smartphones.
Similarly, [31] proposes a blockchain-based solution for the
sharing of healthcare data. The authors present a blockchain
solution that attains security and privacy while sharing the
data globally. Although this research may be termed as a
breakthrough, the granular data secrecy cannot be attained as
all the peers part of the network will be authenticated and will
share the same ledger.
Table I presents a detailed analysis of the COVID-19 contact
tracing apps used by 32 countries. The table discusses the
Country where the app is being used, app name, status (pub-
lic/private/state), usage (mandatory/voluntary), data collected,
and architecture (centralized/decentralized). The concerns are
also highlighted that mainly focus on the security and privacy
breeches. The column “Data Collected” is populated after an-
alyzing the individual app and categorizing the data according
to the guidelines of the WHO. Table II, highlights these cate-
gories and discusses the type of data collected. It is observed
that the apps that are available to download from the play
store are mostly centralised and most of them lead to security
and privacy breech. Some of the apps take consent from the
user before disclosing the data to the government officials or
trusted third parities. Such apps are identified as “No known
privacy concern prior to user’s explicit permission”. We also
refer readers to [32]–[36] that present a survey of the existing
contact tracing apps.
Research [37] has also studied the use of popular smart-
phone based non-cooperative game where the dominating
strategy for all the players is to maintain home isolation. The
proposed game maintains the Nash equilibrium and also allows
the authors to assess the sustainability of a lockdown protocol
with the proposed model. The proposed model allows one to
determine the extent of effectiveness of the lock-down protocol
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TABLE I
A COMPARISON OF COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING APPS USED IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.
Sr.







1. Austria Stopp Corona State Voluntary Type of contact Centralized Inaccuracy
2. Australia COVIDSafe State Voluntary Contact identification,type of contact Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
3. Bahrain BeAwareBahrain Public Voluntary Contact identification Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
4. Bulagria ViruSafe State Voluntary Contact identifications,symptoms Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
5. Canada ABTraceTogether Public Voluntary Contact identifications Centralized
Inaccuracy, trusted third
party, lack of data control,
privacy breech
6. China Alipay & WeChat Private Mandatory Contact identifications Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech





Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
8. Cyprus CovTracer Public/private Voluntary Contact identification Centralized
No known privacy con-
cerns prior to the user’s
explicit permission.
9. Czech Republic eRouška & Mapy.cz Public/private Voluntary Contact identification Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
10. Ghana GH COVID-19Tracker Public Voluntary
Contact identification,
type of contact, actions
taken
Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
11. Iceland Rakning C-19 State Voluntary Contact identification Centralized
No known privacy con-







Public/private/state Mandatory/Voluntary Contact identification,actions taken Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
13. Indonesia Care Protect State Voluntary Contact identification Centralized Trusted third party
14. Israel HaMagen & TrackVirus Public/private -
Contact identification,
type of contact, Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
15. Italy SM_COVID19 Private Voluntary Contact identification,type of contact Decentralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
16. Kyrgyzstan Stop COVID-19KG Public - Contact identification Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
17. North Macedonia StopKorona! Private - Contact identification,type of contact Centralized
No known privacy con-
cerns prior to the user’s
explicit permission.
18. Norway Smittestopp Public/private Voluntary Contact identification Centralized Trusted third party, pri-vacy breech
19. Pakistan COVID-19 GovPK State Voluntary
Contact identification,
type of contact Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
20. Philippines(Cebu) WeTrace Public/private - Contact identification,type of contact Centralized
Trusted third party, lack











Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
22. KSA Rest Assured &Tawakkalna Public Mandatory/Voluntary
Contact identification,
symptoms, actions taken Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
23. Singapore TraceTogether Public Voluntary Contact identification Centralized
No known privacy con-
cerns prior to the user’s
explicit permission.
24. Slovak Republic ZostanZdravy Private - Contact identification,actions taken Centralized
No known privacy con-
cerns prior to the user’s
explicit permission.
25. South Korea Corona 100m Private Voluntary Contact identification,demographics Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
26. Spain CoronaMadrid Public Voluntary Contact identification,symptoms, Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
27. Sri Lanka MyHealth SriLanka Public Voluntary Contact identification Centralized Trusted third party
28. Thailand MorChana Public/private Voluntary Contact identification,type of contact Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
29. Turkey Korona Önlem Public Mandatory Contact identification,symptoms Centralized
Unclear
30. Ukraine Act at home Public Voluntary Contact identification Centralized
Trusted third party, lack
of data control, privacy
breech
31. USA Private kit:SafePaths Private Voluntary Contact identification Centralized
No known privacy con-
cerns prior to the user’s
explicit permission.
32. UK NHS COVID-19 State Voluntary Contact identification Decentralized
No known privacy con-
cerns prior to the user’s
explicit permission.
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TABLE II














• Relationship with the source contact
• Occupation
Type of contact
• Type of contact
• Date of contact





• Shortness of breath
• Diarrhoea
• Loss of taste or smell
• Others
Actions taken
• Date of sample collection
• Contact’s new location and contact
details
with reference to its practicality and adherence by the people.
III. THE PROPOSED PPCCT ARCHITECTURE
A detailed study of the existing COVID-19 contact tracing
apps (presented in the Section II) brings to light the need for
a comprehensive system that provides security and privacy,
authentication and access control, flexibility, scalability, inter-
operability and efficiency. The existing apps cannot be widely
used due to major security concerns, and a novel privacy-
preserving COVID-19 contact tracing architecture is therefore
required. The contact tracing is influenced by a range of at-
tacks that are possible on the data while being transmitted or at
rest. These attacks include eavesdropping sensitive information
and patient’s privacy breach when they come in contact with
a COVID-19 positive. The attackers can be insiders, outsiders,
or both. The main asset that needs to be secured is the user’s
data. The confidentiality of the data should remain intact
while at rest or during transmission. The identity of the user
should be preserved until he/she comes in close contact with a
COVID-19 positive. A major assumption made by the existing
contact tracing architectures is that all stakeholders that are
part of the process are fully trusted and only the outsiders are
marked as a potential threat to the system. Therefore there is
a need for an architecture that can also counter insider threats
in contact tracing. Furthermore, the blockchain technology
is widely being used for the provision of immutability and
provenance. Blockchain is a peer-to-peer distributed ledger
technology that efficiently records transactions in a sequential
tamperproof manner while placing the app user/ patient at the
center of the healthcare ecosystem. The transactions recorded
on blockchains can be shared between individuals that are
part of the network. Every transaction is immutable since it is
timestamped when added to the ledger.
From the perspective of the application scenario in
question; blockchains can be permissionless or permis-
sioned. Permissionless blockchains are very open and enable
pseudonyms/anonymous participants to append new blocks to
the existing distributed ledger. This is a major disadvantage
of permissionless blockchains which supports a very weak
notion of security. In contrast to permissionless blockchains,
permissioned blockchains are based on permissioned networks
that allow only specific entities to participate in the ledger and
thereby add transactions to the blockchain. Each entity is as-
signed a digital identity for identification by a trusted identity
provider and access to the blockchain is granted based on the
access rights governed by the identity provider. This enables
different entities to participate in the permissioned blockchain
based on the access rights assigned. Having said this, typical
blockchains create a distributed peer-to-peer network where
non-confident members can interact with each other without a
trusted intermediary [38].
This paper explores the utilization of a distributed ledger
technology (blockchain) as the underlying infrastructure. Ta-
ble III shows a comparison between two well-known per-
missionless and permissioned blockchain implementations for-
mally referred to as Ethereum and Hyperledger, respectively.
The reader is referred to [39] where a comprehensive compar-
ison of various blockchains is presented.
To design a state-of-the-art COVID-19 contact tracing ar-
chitecture there are several aspects that need to be taken into
account. We firstly elaborate the threat model and design
principles that lead to the overview of the PPCCT architecture.
A. Design Principles for PPCCT
The PPCCT architecture requires adherence to certain de-
sign goals for secure and reliable contact monitoring and in-
ference. Depending on the analysis presented in the Section II,
we identify the security and access control requirements that
give rise to the inter-related design principles as follows:
1) Security and privacy is the primary objective of the
PPCCT architecture to preserve people’s privacy, in
accordance with the CIA (confidentiality, integrity, and
availability) triad.
2) Authentication and access control in the proposed
PPCCT architecture should enable only authenticated
entities to become part of the COVID-19 contact tracing
application. This will also ensure non-repudiation and
accountability based on secure credentials associated
with people.
3) Flexibility and scalability in the PPCCT should with-
stand bottlenecks and single point of failures. This re-
quires a distributed architecture scalable across different
entities involved in the contact tracing application. At the
same time, the PPCCT architecture should be flexible
enough to meet the requirements of the entities that are
part of contact tracing architecture.
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TABLE III
A COMPARISON OF ETHEREUM AND HYPERLEDGER.
Feature Ethereum Hyperledger
Architecture type Generic blockchain platform Modular blockchain platform
Model type Permissionless Permissioned
Consensus Proof of work Pluggable consensus
Governance Ethereum LINUX foundation
Smart contract implementation Smart contracts Chaincode
Currency Ether and tokens based on smart contracts Tokens based on chaincode
4) Interoperability and efficiency is an objective in the
PPCCT architecture that should enable monitoring, iden-
tification and the contact data management. This goal
can be achieved by designing a architecture that allows
interoperability among different technologies, entities
and components involved. This would result in the
availability-on-demand, effective and efficient reporting
activities between the entities.
B. PPCCT Reference Architecture
Fig. 1 presents the reference architecture for the proposed
COVID-19 contact tracing application based on blockchain.
The architecture is focused on Hyperledger Fabric and is
an extension of the reference architecture presented by IBM
in [40]. Table IV highlights the events that occur when the
architecture is in place. It may be observed that the PPCCT
architecture does not rely on a particular variant of the
primitive technologies including encryption, access control,
inference that are part of the PPCCT architecture. Therefore,
the architecture can be tuned and integrated according to the
application requirements.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PPCCT ARCHITECTURE
The following section discusses the provisioned security
advantages of the PPCCT architecture with reference to the
incorporated technologies and the design goals mentioned in
Section III. The incorporated technologies have been carefully
chosen as a consequence of which the desired security goals
are achieved.
A. Security and Privacy
In the proposed PPCCT architecture, access can be gained
only by those who are using the COVID-19 contact tracing
App and have been granted access to a specific action on
the PPCCT network. Privacy in PPCCT is maintained by
agreement about which entity has access/permission to what
resource. As PPCCT is a permissioned blockchain architec-
ture, data stored on the blockchain can be shared securely with
only pre-approved and trusted group of entities. Furthermore,
since the data is homomorphically encrypted at the source,
this maintains the confidentiality of the data at rest and
during transmission. Each trusted entity has a private key
and a public key that acts as an open identifier. A person’s
private key is required to access the relevant information from
the blockchain. This public/private key encryption scheme
allows patients to share unique information with different
contact tracing data providers on an as-needed-basis. Even if a
patient’s private key is exposed, the damage is contained and
other records remain secure. The PPCCT architecture makes
use of a privacy-preserving homomorphic-based searchable
encryption (HSE) that provides confidentiality of the data
while preserving the privacy of the contact data. Hence,
the merger of these technologies in the PPCCT architecture
helps to achieve the security and privacy goals. The proposed
PPCCT architecture thwarts the possible attacks as the data is
encrypted at the source, therefore, eavesdropping, spoofing,
or any type of meaningful manipulation of source data is
not possible. Furthermore, since the architecture is based
on permissioned blockchain, only an authorized person can
gain access to the network hence reducing the attack surface
associated with unauthorized access.
B. Authentication and Access Control
The PPCCT architecture integrates technologies specifically
designed for enforcing authentication and access control. The
PPCCT architecture utilizes the services of a permissioned
blockchain that fully govern all the access control policies
involved in the architecture. The access management module
is able to manage security objects like X.509 certificates
and tokens, as well as provide ABAC services based on the
XACML standard. For authentication, token-based authenti-
cation [41] has been used, which authenticates users with
their usernames and password, and obtains a time-limited
cryptographically secure token upon successful authentication.
They are now able to use that token for further authentication
for a session of limited duration. Access control is provided
through a XACML policy decision point (PDP), which is a
decision engine that evaluates user or administrator defined
access control policies to provide fine-grained access control
to the available resources. An advantage of this authentication
and access control approach is that the users can share their
tokens with some trusted entities not only for a limited
time but also a limited set of resources, without having to
share their usernames, passwords or other sensitive security
credentials. This approach is also useful for security evaluation
and auditing purposes.
By virtue of the incorporated technologies; the PPCCT
environment enables people/ patient to maintain full access and
control of their own data, providing access to the government
officials they would like to share their data with. This enables
government officials, hospitals, doctors and patient to connect
and share information instantly and seamlessly, in a secured
way. This is also ideal for medical research, facilitating studies
that can help to better understand COVID-19.
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Fig. 1. Proposed reference architecture.
TABLE IV
DESCRIPTION ON THE STEPS INVOLVED IN THE PPCCT ARCHITECTURE.
Steps Description
1 A user has already registered with an application encryption server and fetches his private key.This key will be used for verification purposes and will be used to access the contact tracing application.
2 A user gains access to the blockchain network through his mobile device that runs a contact tracing application.
3 The mobile application encrypts the data at source before sharing it across the peers. The data is encrypted using homomorphic encryption
4 The edge services convert the homomorphically encrypted data into the blockchain-specific format.
5 The request along with the data specifics are forwarded to the blockchain application and forwarded to the peers.
6 Since, the blockchain application is a private network; it uses the identity and access management to authenticate and authorize a useraccess/modification to the ledger.
7 The application logic invokes the smart contract by forwarding/ routing user requests to the transaction manager via an optional message bus.
8 The transaction manager processes the requests received from the application logic via the message bus.
9
The transaction manager invokes the smart contract depending upon the request received from the application logic and
in relation to the user credentials. The request can primarily include, put, get or query a transaction.
Put transaction will be triggered to make note of the contacts made by a user.
Get may be triggered to uncover the identity of the user once tested positive for COVID-19.
A query may be triggered to reveal the contacts made with a COVID-19 positive patient.
10 The transaction manager invokes the smart contract and the payloaddepending upon the type of request made, the transaction is added to the ledger of the appropriate nodes.
11
The blockchain network relies on a consensus algorithm. The permissioned blockchain will use endorsing
peers that will endorse a transaction based on byzantine fault tolerance
and ordering service. This will govern that only correct information is added to the ledger.
12 In some cases, the blokchcain will need to be accessed by external systems such as insurance companies, WHO, pharmacists, etc.This would essentially disclose anonymized data such as the total number of positive cases.
13 The application interfaces with the external enterprise applications for further analytics of the data store on the blockchain network.
14 The user identification information is stored on the enterprise application.
15 An external COVID-19 test is performed that may be a PCR test, RNA test or antibody test.
16 The COVID-19 test result is shared with the hospital.
17 The hospital may send the report to the enterprise application, that is further sent to the application logic via the transformation and connectivity
18 For positive cases reported, the data will be inferred to uncover the contacts made with a COVID-19 positive patient.
19 Upon the successful identification of the relevant blocks containing data regarding the contact made with a COVID-19 positive patient,the data will be decrypted and the identities will be revealed for further testing by the hospital.
Note:
During the entire process, the data is not decrypted or revealed to the unauthorized entities. Get commands can be triggered
only over the transactions that have been identified to contain information regarding the contact with the COVID positive.
This would then disclose a subset of the anonymized data to only authorized personnel. The authorized person would
further perform some diagnosis or share the data with the healthcare department.
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Fig. 2. COVID-19 contact tracing Hyperledger Fabric network-ledger overview.
C. Flexibility and Scalability
PPCCT is based on a distributed ledger technology, thus
preventing bottle-necks and single point of failures in the
COVID-19 contact tracing. The distributed nature of the ledger
also ensures that no permissioned member or a group of
members can modify or control the entries in the ledger.
This is of great importance in types of applications where
the participating members do not fully trust each other. To
manage the work load created by the users on the distributed
ledger, its members can dynamically increase or decrease the
number of nodes participating in the ledger. Every node in the
distributed ledger is considered equal to other nodes, however,
some nodes can have different roles in the manner in which
they participate in the blockchain network. For example, some
nodes may store partial copies of the blockchain, some may
store a full copy of the blockchain and some may only validate
transactions. Thus members are flexible to choose which kind
of role they want to play in the architecture by focusing on
the types of nodes they include in the blockchain, and also
to manage how they want to scale their participation in the
architecture by increasing or decreasing the number of nodes
they include in the blockchain. Furthermore, in the real world
setting the application would be extended to a cloud-based
solution, thereby benefiting from the extensive benefits the
cloud has to offer including but not limited to scalability,
elasticity, remote processing and availability. The usage of
the cloud would further compliment the features of the the
PPPCCT solution.
D. Interoperability and Efficiency
PPCCT for effective monitoring and COVID-19 record
management could help government organizations bridge tra-
ditional data management problems, thereby considerably
increasing the efficiency. PPCCT’s transparent architecture
eliminates the need for time-consuming reporting activities
that may also lead to single point of failure between the entities
part of the COVID-19 contact tracing application. Hence,
this improves the coordination between the healthcare enti-
ties, thereby increasing the quality and timeliness of contact
tracing. PPCCT also reduces the business costs whereby the
costs of transferring contact records between entities will be
reduced, compliance costs will go down, and auditing will be
much easier. Hyperledger by default supports offerings from
different vendors, which ensures the interoperability of the
different solutions developed using Hyperledger Fabric. The
proposed PPCCT architecture can be extended to a software
development toolkit (SDK) that would allow integration with
an existing COVID-19 bulletin framework, therefore allowing
on-go integration and interoperability.
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Fig. 3. COVID-19 contact tracing Hyperledger Fabric network-user record.
V. COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING SOLUTION
We use Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) [42] for the implemen-
tation of the COVID-19 contact tracing (CCT) solution. Hy-
perledger Fabric is an open-source solution for deploying and
running distributed applications on permissioned blockchains.
Permissioned blockchains are setup among a group of known
and identified users or organisation. Permissioned blockchains
provide a way to insure integrity of the transactions among a
group that have a common goal but which may not fully trust
each other. The distributed applications in Hyperledger Fabric
can be written in standard, general-purpose programming
languages like Java, Go or Node.js, etc. which makes it easier
to be integrated with existing code-bases. The CCT blockchain
solution instantiates and uses the following components pro-
vided by HLF:
• An orderer service, which atomically broadcasts state
updates to peers and establishes consensus on the order
of transactions;
• A membership service provider (MSP), which associates
peers with cryptographic identities;
• Peers, which maintain the ledger locally in form of an
append-only blockchain and as a snapshot of the most
recent state in a key-value store.
The CCT blockchain solution consists of a HLF network
comprising of 4 peers representing two different organizations,
the Hospital and the user, and an orderer node. At the initial
bootstrapping time of our HLF network, the prototype gener-
ates all of the certificates and keys for our various network
entities, the genesis block for the ordering service, and a
collection of configuration transactions required to configure
the blockchain. After this step, our prototype sets up the
blockchain infrastructure using docker and docker-compose
[43], such that each peer node, as well as the orderer service,
is instantiated as a docker container. After the blockchain
network has been started and provisioned, the main operation
is to ensure that the transactions conducted by the participants
of the blockchain are validated according to a common policy,
that is agreed between the designated participants of the
blockchain network. This common policy is also referred to
as the consensus protocol or chaincode of the HLF network.
In the context of the CCT blockchain solution, the consensus
is reached by creating a model in terms of assets, participants,
and transactions. Assets are tangible or intangible goods,
services, or property; participants are uniquely identifiable
entities that can own assets and submit transactions; and
transactions are functions or rules that govern how participants
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Fig. 4. COVID-19 contact tracing Hyperledger Fabric network ledger-contact record.
interact with the assets. We created the model for the CCT
blockchain solution using Hyperledger composer [42], which
is a development toolset that can work with HLF.
A. Proof-of-Concept Demonstration
To model the proposed PPCCT architecture, a COVID-19
contact tracing (CCT) Blockchain solution has been developed
in Hyperledger. The developed CCT Blockchain solution is
based on government officials and hospitals being the partici-
pants and the users/ patients being the assets in the COVID-19
registry. The government officials are added to the COVID-19
registry based on their attributes such as ID, first name, and
last name. The users are added to the COVID-19 registry based
on their contact identification. The hospital and goverment
official can submit and retrieve transactions associated with
a user. This section depicts the full working of the CCT
blockchain solution. It is worth mentioning that the CCT
blockchain solution is implemented as a coherent application.
The components involved in the PPCCT architecture run in
the back end of the CCT solution and cannot be demonstrated.
For this reason, a comprehensive discussion and analysis of
the underlying architecture is presented in the earlier sections
and thereby finally demonstrating the front end of the system
in this section. Hence, this entire paper covers the front end
and back end aspects of a fully functional CCT solution.
Fig. 2 shows the record of all transactions that are part of
the ledger. This record of transactions can be accessed and
retrieved by the health professional or government officials.
All activity that is carried out by the participants as part of
the CCT blockchain solution is logged and the ledger in Fig. 2
showcases the log of all these transactions. As mentioned in
the Section III, all the data records related to the contact
are encrypted before being stored on the ledger. Therefore,
the system allows a range of queries over the encrypted
data to identify the connections and accordingly stores the
data as a transaction. The record of all transactions can be
retrieved by the health professional or government official by
selecting all transactions; thereby viewing all the transactions
that have been carried out. Each transaction in the ledger has a
timestamp and a type associated with the transaction. The type
associated with the transaction is an attribute that is assigned
at the time of participant creation, asset creation or creation of
a new transaction. The AddUse type signifies the addition of a
new user to the COVID-19 contact tracing Hyperledger Fabric
network, the contact signifies the type of contact made to a
user already part of the network and the treatment is triggered
by the hospital to treat a COVID-19 positive patient.
A detailed record of each transaction can be retrieved by
the participant by clicking view record. Fig. 3 depicts a health
professional viewing detailed historian record of a user. As per
the guidelines of the WHO (presented in Table I), the historian
record for the user shows that a unique id is assigned to a
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Fig. 5. COVID-19 contact tracing Hyperledger Fabric network ledger-treatment record.
user and the application records the full name, address, phone
number, passport number, age, gender, and occupation of the
user. The timestamp and transaction id are parameters that are
maintained by the CCT blockchain solution but can be used
by the health professional or government official to see the
timestamp of a certain event/activity.
Fig. 4 shows health professional or government official of
the specifics of the contact that was made between two users.
The user id’s are encrypted to achieve confidentiality. Whereas,
the type of contact, date of contact, and contact duration
is recorded. Fig. 5 shows the treatments that were recom-
mended/carried out associated with a COVID-19 positive. The
symptoms are recorded, samples are collected, and the patient
is isolated. From this point onwards, the government official
will perform search across the encrypted user ids to identify
the contacts made with other users and the COVID-19 sample
collection will carry on to be conducted.
B. Computational Complexity
The most resource intensive task of the proposed CCT
blockchain solution is the computations required to homo-
morphically encrypt the data segments. Although the proposed
PPCCT architecture is not dependent on a particular variant
of homomorphic encryption and has the ability to adapt
any variant, to demonstrate this capability and its feasibility,
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Fig. 6. Homomorphic encryption-time required to encrypt.
been implemented on a stand alone system. The system
specifications include Ubuntu 18.04 running over an Intel
Core i7 processor having 8GB RAM. The CCT blockchain
solution is mainly based on the encryption, search and the
decryption operations supported by homomorphic encryption.
For illustration of the results, we have taken a total of 100 data
segments that are encrypted gradually with an increment of 10
segments on each iteration. Figs. 6, 7, and 8 demonstrate the
time required to encrypt, search, and decrypt those 100 data
segments. It can be observed that these operations generally
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Fig. 8. Homomorphic encryption-time required to decrypt.
show a linear growth with the increase in the data segments.
The total time required to encrypt the 100 data segments is
0.088 s. Whereas, for the search and decryption the total time
required is 77.3 s and 0.074 s, respectively.
As apparent from the demonstration of the CCT blockchain
solution, the proposed PPCCT architecture is a more secure,
privacy preserving, reliable, effective and efficient solution for
the COVID-19 contact tracing.
VI. CONCLUSION
The COVID-19 pandemic has stunned the world due to its
impact on human health. The pandemic has spread so rapidly
that many nations were ill prepared to combat its spread which
led to unnecessary deaths. Once the healthcare system started
to show signs of being overwhelmed governments followed
the recommendations of the WHO and enforced lock down
protocols of various stringency to limit the community spread
of the pandemic. To track the movement of individuals in
lock down and monitor interactions at the community level, a
total of 32 countries put effort to launch smartphone apps that
collect data of various nature. This paper presents a detailed
study of the apps introduced by 32 countries and shows that
the apps collect personal data on a vast level which is a
gross violation of user privacy. Analysis has shown that the
applications collected data related to demographics, contact
identification, type of contact made with COVID positive in-
dividual, user symptoms, etc. Owing to this the apps were not
well received by the users and concerns were expressed over
their privacy. This paper proposes a novel privacy-preserving
COVID-19 contact tracing (PPCCT) architecture. The PPCCT
architecture is based on blockchain Hyperledger Fabric and of-
fers enhanced security, privacy, authentication, access control,
flexibility, scalability, interoperability and efficiency thanks
to the state-of-the-art technologies including searchable en-
cryption and inference over the encrypted blockchain data.
The proposed architecture has the potential to resolve all the
prevalent issues in the existing application and if deployed
could effectively and efficiently flatten the COVID-19 curve
by limiting the proliferation of community spread cases.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was done collaboratively by the Information
Security and Privacy Lab, NUST supported by the National
Centre for Cyber Security, Pakistan, under the project titled
“Privacy Preserving Search over Sensitive Data Stored in the
Cloud” and the City, University of London, UK.
REFERENCES
[1] A. A. Balkhair, “COVID-19 pandemic: A new chapter in the history of
infectious diseases,” Oman Medical J., vol. 35, no. 2, p. e123, 2020.
[2] “COVID-19 dashboard by the center for systems science and
engineering (CSSE) at johns hopkins university (JHU).” [Online].
Available: https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
[3] World health organization et al., “Contact tracing in the context of covid-
19: interim guidance, 10 may 2020,” Tech. Rep., 2020.
[4] L. Cirrincione et al., “COVID-19 pandemic: Prevention and protection
measures to be adopted at the workplace,” Sustainability, vol. 12, no. 9,
p. 3603, 2020.
[5] European commission. 2018 reform of EU data protection rules.
[Online]. Available: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/
files/data-protection-factsheet-changes_en.pdf
[6] C. J. Hoofnagle, B. van der Sloot, and F. Z. Borgesius, “The european
union general data protection regulation: What it is and what it means,”
Inf. Commun. Technology Law, vol. 28, no. 1, pp. 65–98, 2019.
[7] P. Edemekong, P. Annamaraju, and M. Haydel, “Health insurance
portability and accountability act,” StatPearls, vol. 72, no. 2, pp. 9–18,
2020.
[8] S. Ikeda, “Coronavirus adds an extra layer of challenge to
collection and handling of health data under the GDPR,” Apr. 2020.
[Online]. Available: https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/
coronavirus-adds-an-extra-layer-of-challenge-to-collection-and-handling/
[9] S. N. Williams, C. J. Armitage, T. Tampe, and K. Dienes, “Public
attitudes towards COVID-19 contact tracing apps: A uk-based focus
group study,” Health Expectations, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 377–385, 2021.
[10] A. Dubovitskaya, Z. Xu, S. Ryu, M. Schumacher, and F. Wang, “Secure
and trustable electronic medical records sharing using blockchain,” in
AMIA annual symposium proceedings, vol. 2017. American Medical
Informatics Association, 2017, p. 650.
[11] Q. Xia, E. B. Sifah, A. Smahi, S. Amofa, and X. Zhang, “BBDS:
Blockchain-based data sharing for electronic medical records in cloud
environments,” Information, vol. 8, no. 2, p. 44, 2017.
[12] R. Faragher and R. Harle, “Location fingerprinting with bluetooth low
energy beacons,” IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun., vol. 33, no. 11, pp.
2418–2428, 2015.
[13] M. S. Munir, D. H. Kim, A. K. Bairagi, and C. S. Hong, “When cvar
meets with bluetooth pan: A physical distancing system for COVID-19
proactive safety,” IEEE Sensors J., vol. 21, no. 12, pp. 13 858–13 869,
2021.
[14] PEPP-PT Team. Pan-European privacy-preserving proximity tracing.
[Online]. Available: https://github.com/pepp-pt/pepp-pt-documentation/
blob/master/PEPP-PT-high-level-overview.pdf
[15] J. Bay et al., “Bluetrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-
driven contact tracing across borders,” Government Technology Agency-
Singapore, Tech. Rep, 2020.
372 JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS AND NETWORKS, VOL. 23, NO. 5, OCTOBER 2021
[16] S. Chen, J. Yang, W. Yang, C. Wang, and T. Bärnighausen, “COVID-19
control in China during mass population movements at new year,” The
Lancet, vol. 395, no. 10226, pp. 764–766, 2020.
[17] Ministry of the interior and safety. South korea-self-quarantine safety
protection app. [Online]. Available: https://play.google.com/store/apps/
details?id=kr.go.safekorea.sqsm
[18] Singapore Government agency. “tracetogether”. [Online]. Available:
https://www.tracetogether.gov.sg/
[19] Government of India. “aarogya setu”. [Online]. Available: https:
//play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=nic.goi.aarogyasetu
[20] Government of Australia. The COVIDSafe app. [Online]. Available:
https://www.australia.gov.au/app
[21] H. Coffey, “Coronavirus tracking app exposes cheat-
ing partners in South Korea,” May 2020. [On-
line]. Available: https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/love-sex/
coronavirus-tracking-app-cheating-partners-married-south-korea-affair
[22] E. Daw, “Component-based comparison of privacy-first
exposure notification,” May 2020. [Online]. Available:
https://tcncoalition.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/tcn_component_based_
comparison_between_privacy_first_exposure_notification_protocols.pdf
[23] C. Troncoso et al., “Decentralized privacy-preserving proximity tracing,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.12273, 2020.
[24] Privacy-preserving contact tracing. [Online]. Available: https://www.
apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/
[25] Governo Italiano Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Immuni.
[Online]. Available: https://www.immuni.italia.it/download.html
[26] Corona-Warn-App open source project. Corona-Warn-App. [Online].
Available: https://www.coronawarn.app/en/
[27] Republic of Poland. ProteGo Safe. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.gov.pl/web/protegosafe




[29] NHS COVID-19 app. [Online]. Available: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/
covid-19-response/nhs-covid-19-app/
[30] S. Vaudenay, “Analysis of DP3T between Scylla and Charybdis,” Apr.
2020. [Online]. Available: https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/399.pdf
[31] S. Biswas et al., “GlobeChain: An interoperable blockchain for global
sharing of healthcare data - a COVID-19 perspective,” IEEE Consumer
Electron. Mag., vol. 10, no. 5, pp. 64–69, Sept. 2021.
[32] J. Li and X. Guo, “COVID-19 contact-tracing apps: A survey on the
global deployment and challenges,” arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.03599,
2020.
[33] L. Simko, R. Calo, F. Roesner, and T. Kohno, “COVID-19 contact
tracing and privacy: Studying opinion and preferences,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:2005.06056, 2020.
[34] L. Reichert, S. Brack, and B. Scheuermann, “A survey of automatic
contact tracing approaches,” ACM Trans. Comput. Healthcare, vol. 2,
no. 2, pp. 1–33, 2021.
[35] A. Aravindan and S. Phartiyal, “Bluetooth phone apps for tracking
COVID-19 show modest early results,” Reuters, April, vol. 21, 2020.
[36] “Office of the privacy commissioner: Overview of COVID-19 contact
tracing apps,” 12 May 2020. [Online]. Available: https://privacy.org.nz/
assets/2020-05-12-OPC-Comparison-of-COVID-19-Apps-colours.pdf
[37] A. K. Bairagi et al., “Controlling the outbreak of COVID-19: A
noncooperative game perspective,” IEEE Access, vol. 8, pp. 215 570–
215 581, 2020.
[38] P. K. Sharma, S. Singh, Y.-S. Jeong, and J. H. Park, “Distblocknet: A
distributed blockchains-based secure sdn architecture for iot networks,”
IEEE Commun. Mag., vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 78–85, 2017.
[39] Z. Hintzman, “Comparing blockchain implementations,” in 2017 Fall
Technical Forum. SCTE/ISBE, 2017, pp. 1–29.
[40] IBM-blockchain architecture for trusted transactions. [On-
line]. Available: https://www.ibm.com/cloud/architecture/architectures/
blockchainArchitecture/reference-architecture
[41] R. Winch, Spring Security 3.1. Packt Publishing Ltd, 2012.
[42] E. Androulaki et al., “Hyperledger Fabric: A distributed operating
system for permissioned blockchains,” in Proc. ACM EuroSys, 2018.
[43] J. Turnbull, The docker book. Lulu. com, 2014.
[44] Helib documentation. [Online]. Available: https://homenc.github.io/
HElib/
Shahzaib Tahir received his Ph.D. in Information
Engineering from City, University of London, UK
in January 2019. He received his B.E. degree in
Software Engineering from Bahria University, Islam-
abad, Pakistan, in 2013. In 2015, he received his
M.S. degree in Information Security from NUST,
Islamabad, Pakistan. Currently, he is an Assistant
Professor in the Department of Information Secu-
rity, NUST. He is also the Founder and the Chief
Technical Officer of CityDefend Limited, UK. His
research interest include applied cryptography and
cloud security. He is a Senior Member of IEEE. He is a Reviewer of
many high impact journals including IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics,
IEEE ICC, Elsevier FGCS, Springer Cluster Computing, Springer Sadhna,
Springer Science China Information Sciences, Springer Neural Computing
and Applications. He has been a TPC Member of many international IEEE
conferences. Dr. Shahzaib Tahir is also an alumni of InnovateUK CyberASAP.
Hasan Tahir is an Assistant Professor and Head of
Department Information Security at School of Elec-
trical Engineering and Computer Science (SEECS),
NUST. He holds a Ph.D. in Information Security
from the University of Essex UK. He obtained his
B.E. in Software Engineering from Bahria Uni-
versity, Islamabad, Pakistan and MS in Software
Engineering from College of E&ME, NUST. He was
the recipient of the University of Essex Doctoral
Scholarship award. He specializes in Computer Se-
curity and IoT. He actively researches applications
of cryptography in one to one and group settings. His primary area of research
is the use of Physically Unclonable Functions for securing group of devices.
He teaches courses related to applied cryptography, cyber security, informa-
tion security management, cloud computing security, software engineering,
software requirements analysis and design. He has served as a committee
member in many renowned IEEE conferences. He is a Senior Member of
IEEE.
Ali Sajjad is a Senior Security Researcher in British
Telecom UK, where he contributes to internal re-
search and innovation programmes and international
research collaboration activities in the areas of Se-
cure Cloud Storage, Cyber Security and Cloud-
based Managed Security Services. He has over 10
years’ academic and industrial experience in Data
and Network Security. He holds a Ph.D. in Informa-
tion Engineering from City University London, UK
and Masters degree in Computer Engineering from
Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea.
Muttukrishnan Rajarajan is Professor of Security
Engineering at the City, University of London, UK.
He obtained his Ph.D. from City University London
in 2001. His research expertise are in the areas
of mobile security, intrusion detection and privacy
techniques. He has chaired several international con-
ferences in the area of information security and
involved in the editorial boards of several security
and network journals. He is also a visiting fellow
at the British Telecommunications (BT) UK and is
currently actively engaged in the UK Governments
Identity Assurance programme (Verify UK). He is a Senior Member of IEEE,
Member of ACM and Advisory board member of the Institute of Information
Security Professionals UK.
TAHIR et al.: PRIVACY-PRESERVING COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING USING BLOCKCHAIN 373
F. Khan received his Ph.D. degree from the School
of Cyber Engineering, Xidian University in 2018.
Currently he works at the National University of
Science and Technology, Pakistan. His research in-
terests includes but not limited to outsourced data
access control, blockchain, and privacy preserving
techniques. His professional services include Tech-
nical Program Committee Member and reviewer for
several international journals and conferences.
